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企業間の取引関係と R&D スピルオーバー 
文部科学省 科学技術・学術政策研究所 第 1 研究グループ 
池内 健太 René Belderbos 深尾 京司 金 榮愨 権 赫旭 
要旨 研究開発（R&D）スピルオーバーと生産性に関する先行研究では、技術的近接性と地理的近
接性の役割に比べて、取引関係の役割はこれまであまり注目されてこなかった。そこで本研究では、
企業の個々の供給企業と顧客企業が識別できるユニークなデータを、『工業統計調査』及び『科学技
術研究調査』に接合したデータを用いて、日本の製造業における取引関係を通じた R&D スピルオー
バー効果を分析する。本研究では、2 万を超える工場のミクロデータを用いた分析を行い、次のような
点を明らかにした。第 1 に、顧客企業や供給企業の R&D ストックは企業の工場レベルの生産性を高
める効果を持ち、その効果は技術的な近接性や地理的な近接性による R&D スピルオーバー効果に
比べて大きいことがわかった。第 2 に、取引先企業との間に資本関係があるとさらにその効果は大きく
なることもわかった。第 3 に、技術的な近接性に基づく R&D スピルオーバー効果は地理的な距離が
遠くなると次第に小さくなるが、取引先からのスピルオーバーの場合は地理的な距離の影響を受けな
いこともわかった。これらの結果は、取引関係に基づくスピルオーバーは R&Dの生産性に対する効果
や R&D の社会的なリターンの大きさを決める重要な要素となっている可能性を示唆している。 
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ABSTRACT  The role of buyers and suppliers has received little attention in the literature on 
research and development (R&D) spillovers and productivity, which has focused primarily on the 
moderating roles of technological and geographic proximity.  In this study, we examine R&D 
spillovers that result from buyer and supplier relationships at the transaction level, utilizing a 
unique dataset identifying individual buyers and suppliers of Japanese manufacturing firms, 
matched with data from R&D surveys and the Census of Manufacturers. In an analysis of more 
than 20,000 Japanese manufacturing plants, we find that R&D stocks of buyers and suppliers 
provide a substantial productivity performance premium over and above the effect of 
technologically and geographically proximate R&D stocks. These effects are magnified if the 
supplier and buyer have business group ties based on capital ownership relationships. While the 
effects of technologically proximate R&D decay with distance, this is not the case for spillovers 
from buyers and suppliers. Our results identify transaction-based spillovers as a key influence on 
productivity and social returns to R&D.   
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‐概 要‐ 
背景・目的 
企業の研究開発（R&D）は当該企業自身の生産性の上昇に寄与するのみでなく、様々な経路を
通じて他社の生産性にも影響すると言われており、この現象は「R&Dスピルオーバー」と呼ばれ
る。これまで R&D スピルオーバーが生産性に与える効果に関する先行研究においては、技術的
近接性と地理的近接性の役割が主に注目され、多くの実証分析も行われてきた（例えば、Adams and 
Jaffe 1996）。それに対して、取引関係の役割は産業連関表を用いた集計レベルのデータに基づく
分析等（例えば、Goto and Suzuki  1989）に限定され、これまで詳細な分析があまりされてこなか
った。一方、海外直接投資（Foreign Direct Investments: FDI）に関する先行研究では、国際的企業
の進出から地元の企業への知識のスピルオーバーにおいて、財・サービスの取引関係が重要な経
路であることが指摘されている（例えば、Haskel他 2007）。つまり、生産性の高い海外企業と直
接取引を持った地元の原材料や部品、中間サービスの供給者のパフォーマンスが上昇することが
多くの先行研究で確認されている。 
また、欧州のイノベーション調査（Community Innovation Survey: CIS）を用いたいくつかの先
行研究においても顧客や供給者から得た情報やそれら企業との協力関係が企業の生産性にとっ
て重要であることが指摘されている（例えば、Belderbos他 2012）。しかし、これら CISのデータ
を用いた研究は、個々の企業が実際にどの企業と取引関係を持っているかについては、分析され
ていない。そのため、これらの先行研究では、取引関係の有無やタイプによって R&D スピルオ
ーバーの大きさがどの程度異なるか定量的に明らかになっていない。 
そこで、本研究では、日本の製造業企業における個々の供給企業と顧客企業が識別できるユニ
ークなデータを『工業統計調査』及び『科学技術研究調査』と接合したデータを用いて、取引関
係を通じた R&D スピルオーバー効果を定量的に分析する。また、取引関係がない場合の技術的
な近接性や地理的な近接性を通じた企業間の R&D スピルオーバーと取引関係を通じたスピルオ
ーバーが生産性に与える効果の大きさを定量的に比較するとともに、取引関係の有無によって企
業間の距離の効果がどのように変化するかについても分析を行う。 
データ・分析方法 
本研究では個別企業の主要な取引先企業（顧客及び原材料や部品等の供給者）に関する詳細な
企業情報が収録された『TSR企業相関ファイル』（東京商工リサーチ）1を『工業統計調査』（経済
                                                   
 
1 本研究で用いた『TSR企業相関ファイル』（東京商工リサーチ）は、経済産業研究所（RIETI）
から提供を受けたデータである。 
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産業省）及び『科学技術研究調査』（総務省）と企業レベルで接合したデータを用いて分析する。
『TSR企業相関ファイル』は企業ごとの主要な顧客企業と仕入先企業の企業コードを収録したデ
ータベースであり、このデータを用いることによって、個々の取引関係のレベルで企業間の取引
ネットワークが捉えられる。さらに、『TSR企業相関ファイル』は取引関係のみならず当該企業の
主要株主となっている企業のコードも収録しているため、企業間の資本関係のネットワークも詳
細に把握することができる。 
分析対象は、製造業に属する企業であり、2006年の各企業の取引関係及び R&Dがその企業が
有する工場の 2007年の生産性にどのような影響をもたらすかを分析する。分析の手順は以下の通
りである。まず、『工業統計調査』の個票データを用いて、工場レベルの全要素生産性（Total Factor 
Productivity: TFP）を計測する。工場レベルのデータを企業レベルで名寄せした後、『科学技術研
究調査』の個票データを企業レベルで接合することにより、各工場が所属する企業の R&D を特
定する。他方、『科学技術研究調査』の個票データを用いて、各企業の R&Dストックを推計した
上で（陳腐化率は『民間企業の研究開発に関する調査』（NISTEP）のデータを参照し、ラグは１
年と仮定した）、『TSR企業相関ファイル』に企業レベルで接合し、各企業の主要顧客企業の R&D
ストックや主要な仕入先企業（供給企業）の R&Dストックを特定する。同様に、『TSR企業相関
ファイル』の主要株主企業のデータを用いて、各企業の主要な顧客企業や仕入先企業のうち、資
本関係がある企業の R&Dと資本関係がない企業の R&Dストックについてもそれぞれ特定する。 
これらのデータ処理の結果、最終的には約１万２千社の企業が所有する約２万の工場のデータ
が分析対象となった。最後に、このデータを用いて、工場レベルの TFPを従属変数とし、所属す
る企業の R&Dに加えて、主要顧客企業の R&D、主要仕入先企業の R&D、取引関係のない企業の
R&D等を説明変数とする回帰分析を行う。なお、本研究では、企業間の R&Dスピルオーバーに
よる生産性に与える効果が企業間の関係性（取引関係の有無やタイプ、資本関係の有無）によっ
てどの程度異なるかを表すパラメータを直接推定することにより、R&Dスピルオーバー効果が企
業間の関係性のタイプによってどのように変化するかを定量的に明らかにする。また、企業間の
技術的近接性と地理的近接性がR&Dスピルオーバーの強さに与える効果も同時に推定するため、
非線形回帰分析を適用する。 
本研究の分析結果とその政策的含意 
本研究で得られた主な分析結果は次の３点である。 
１．顧客企業や供給企業の R&Dストックは企業の工場レベルの生産性を高める効果を持ち、
その効果は技術的な近接性や地理的な近接性による R&Dスピルオーバー効果に比べても
非常に大きい（概要図表 1）。 
２．取引先企業との間に資本関係があるとさらに R&Dスピルオーバー効果は大きくなる（概
要図表 1）。 
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３．技術的な近接性に基づく R&Dスピルオーバー効果は地理的な距離が遠くなると次第に小
さくなるが、取引先からのスピルオーバーの場合は地理的な距離の影響を受けない。 
これらの結果は、取引関係に基づくスピルオーバーは R&Dの生産性に対する効果や R&Dの社
会的なリターンの大きさを決める重要な要素となっている可能性を示している。 
したがって、政府が補助金や税額控除などの制度を用いて企業の R&D を助成する際には、多
くの顧客企業や供給企業を有する企業、すなわち企業間取引ネットワークのハブになっている企
業の R&D を助成することでより経済効果が大きくなることが示唆される。また、国内の企業間
の取引ネットワークの密度が高いほど、国内で企業の R&D を促進するような政策の効果が高い
ことも示唆される。その一方、海外の企業との取引関係・資本関係が国際的な R&D スピルオー
バー効果の大きさにおいても重要な影響を持つことも示唆されるが、国際的な R&D スピルオー
バーの効果の詳細な把握と定量的な分析は今後の課題である。 
 
概要図表 1：知識源との取引関係・資本関係別 R&Dスピルオーバーの相対的な強さ 
 
注）取引関係がない他企業の R&Dからのスピルオーバー効果を 1とした相対値。 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The extant literature on R&D spillovers and social returns to R&D has largely focused on the 
attenuating roles of geographic and technological distance between firms (Jaffe et al., 1993; 
Adams and Jaffe, 1996; Aldieri and Cincera, 2009; Lychagin et al., 2010; Bloom et al., 2013; 
Orlando, 2004; Griffith et al., 2009; Mairesse and Mulkay, 2008). These studies examine the 
productivity effects of ‘pure’ knowledge spillovers due to the partial public good nature of 
knowledge, independent of any transactions between firms. Much less attention has been given 
in this literature to ‘transaction based’ R&D spillovers that result from buyer and supplier 
relationships and how they influence productivity growth. A separate stream of literature on the 
role of spillovers in the context of foreign direct investments has, however, suggested that 
'vertical' spillovers through buyer-supplier relationships is often a key channel through which 
                                                   
* This paper is the result of a joint research project of the National Institute of Science and Technology Policy 
(NISTEP) and the Research Institute for Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) under the “Science for Science, 
Technology and Innovation Policy” program. René Belderbos gratefully acknowledges financial support from 
NISTEP, and the Centre for Economic Institutions and the Joint Usage and Research Center (Fiscal 2014 
Project Research Program) at the Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. 
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spillovers due to multinational firms’ investments in local firms occur (e.g. Haskel et al., 2007; 
Görg and Strobl, 2001; Javorcik, 2004; Kugler, 2006). Similarly, research based on community 
innovation surveys regarding the sources of knowledge for the effective innovation of firms has 
demonstrated the relative frequency and importance of knowledge originating from buyers and 
suppliers as opposed to firms in the same industry (e.g. Belderbos, Carree, and Lokshin, 2004; 
Belderbos, Gilsing, and Lokshin, 2012; Crespi et al., 2008).  
 
In this study, we examine the relative importance of R&D spillovers from buyers and suppliers 
as compared with R&D spillovers from geographically and technologically proximate firms. In 
contrast to prior work that has made use of input-output tables to establish indicators of 
‘relational proximity’ (e.g. Goto and Suzuki, 1989) we identify the presence of actual transaction 
relationships between pairs of firms by utilizing a unique dataset identifying the major individual 
buyers and suppliers of Japanese manufacturing firms in 2006 as well as capital ties between the 
firms. We match this data with plant-level micro data drawn from the census of manufacturers 
and Japan’s comprehensive R&D survey to analyse plant-level total factor productivity in 
relationship with firms’ own R&D stock, geographically and technologically distributed R&D 
stocks of the population of other firms in Japan, and the R&D stocks of the firms suppliers and 
buyers. The R&D survey data in combination with the census data allows us to construct relevant 
R&D stocks weighted by technological proximity between industries (e.g. Bloom et al., 2013), 
while the information on plant locations allows us to explore the role of geographic distance 
between firms. We utilize data on bilateral buyer-supplier linkages in the database compiled by 
Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR, 2006) and can examine the relationship with productivity for more 
than 20,000 manufacturing plants. We adopt the standard knowledge stock augmented 
production function framework (e.g. Hall et al., 2012). We identify distance effects by estimating 
exponential decay parameters for plant-level R&D stocks (e.g. Lychagin et al., 2010; Duranton 
and Overman, 2005). Our key research objectives are to 1) establish the role of R&D spillovers 
through buyer and supplier linkages – with and without capital relationships with the focal firm – 
in comparison with the influence of general spillovers due to geographic and technological 
proximity, and 2) to assess the (reduced) effect of geographic distance on the magnitude of 
spillovers in cases in which there is an established buyer-supplier relationship.  
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We note that knowledge spillovers in buyer-supplier relationships will have purposeful and 
pecuniary elements. First, since knowledge usually has important tacit and non-codified elements 
and is costly to transfer (e.g. Teece, 1977; Feldman and Lichtenberg, 1998), buyer or supplier 
interactions between firms are likely to aid information flows and may assist in effective 
knowledge spillovers or purposeful knowledge transfers. Second, to the extent that knowledge 
due to suppliers is embedded in intermediate inputs, its value tends not to be fully reflected in the 
price of such intermediates, leading to ‘pecuniary’ or rent spillovers due to transactions with 
suppliers (Hall et al., 2012; Crespi et al., 2008).1 In this case, productivity increases on the part 
of the clients do not necessarily represent technological advances or externalities. Belderbos and 
Mohnen (2013) argue that productivity-enhancing effects of pecuniary spillovers are hard to 
dissociate from spillover effects. Tacit knowledge flows may occur in addition to the rent 
generating effects of the input supplied. Firms utilizing the higher quality, technology-embodied 
inputs will often have to adapt technologies and processes to optimize the use of these inputs, 
creating productivity benefits, and potentially providing technological opportunities for further 
productivity improvement. Hence, pecuniary spillovers will often incorporate or be correlated 
with elements of ‘pure’ knowledge spillovers and technological advances in the downstream 
industry. Compared with ‘horizontal’ spillovers within narrowly defined industries among firms 
in technological proximity of one another, the absence of market rivalry provides greater 
incentives for productivity and growth enhancing knowledge exchange and spillovers through 
supplier-buyer relationships (e.g. Bloom et al., 2013). Studies demonstrating a positive 
relationship between knowledge originating with suppliers and firm innovation performance 
attest to this (e.g. Belderbos, Carree, and Lokshin, 2004; Belderbos and Grimpe, 2012). In the 
current study, we are unable to disentangle rent spillover from knowledge spillover effects in 
buyer-supplier relationships. We do disentangle technological proximity and ‘relational’ 
proximity effects by identifying (plants of) individual buyers and suppliers, their industries, and 
their geographic proximity to the focal firm’s plants.  
                                                   
1 We note that rent spillovers are unlikely to be a feature of customer-originating spillovers. The role of 
pecuniary spillovers due to mispricing are less likely to play a role or to play a different role: quality 
improvements may be less reflected in the price of the intermediate inputs, as sophisticated, demanding 
users providing guidance on specifications and standards are probably able to negotiate input prices 
downwards. Any productivity improvement due to customer interaction is therefore most likely to reflect 
improved quality of products and processes.  
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Our study relates to a limited set of papers examining productivity effects of supplier and buyer 
relationships. Crespi et al. use direct measures of knowledge flows as they are revealed in U.K. 
innovation surveys to establish a relationship with Total Factor Productivity (TFP). They find 
that knowledge spillovers from competitors and suppliers contribute to TFP growth and 
complement intra-firm technology transfers. Belderbos and Grimpe (2012), using German 
innovation survey data, find positive productivity effects of knowledge flows from domestic 
customers and competitors. These studies did not identify specific buyers or suppliers and the 
R&D conducted or not. A recent exception is the study by Isaksson, Simeth, and Seifert (2014), 
which examines the relationship between firms’ patent productivity and the patent productivity 
of major buyers for 192 supplying firms in the U.S. They find positive buyer effects in particular 
if the buyer relationship is long lasting. Another exception is Todo et al. (2015), who examine the 
effects of buyer-supplier networks on firms’ productivity and innovative capability (measured by 
the number of patent applications), focusing on the role of geographic proximity. They find 
positive effects of the number of distant suppliers and neighbouring clients on productivity and 
positive effects of the number of distant suppliers and clients on innovative capability. However, 
Todo et al. (2015) do not examine the effects of spillovers from external knowledge sources 
captured by R&D investment or patent stock outside the firm. Earlier work on R&D and 
productivity in business groups also identified individual firms, but has been limited to 
identified, publicly listed firms with business group ties. Suzuki (1993) and Branstetter (2000) 
find positive effects on productivity growth of R&D stocks when there are related firms in the 
Japanese business group, and they attribute this to intra-group knowledge sharing and stable 
supply relationships (Belderbos, Wakasugi, and Zou, 2012).  
 
Our study is the first to provide direct evidence on the relationship between productivity and 
R&D investments of both individual buyers and suppliers. We find that R&D stocks of buyers 
and suppliers provide a substantial productivity performance premium over and above the effect 
of technologically and geographically proximate R&D stocks. These effects are magnified if the 
supplier and buyer have capital ties. While the effects of technologically proximate R&D decay 
with distance, this is not the case for spillovers from buyer and supplier plants. While distance is 
likely to affect the likelihood that transaction relationships occur, as exemplified by 
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geographically concentrated buyer and supplier plants, given that transactions take place, 
distance no longer attenuates knowledge spillovers. Our results identify transaction-based 
spillovers as key influences on productivity and social returns to R&D.  
 
2. MODEL AND FRAMEWORK 
We conduct a plant-level panel analysis of total factor productivity, in which we relate plant-level 
TFP to R&D spillover pools, and in particular R&D stocks of the individual suppliers and buyers 
of the firm that operates the plant. The models include firms’ own R&D stock and a set of plant-, 
firm-, and industry-level controls. We assume that firm-level R&D stocks are available to all the 
firms’ plants and that R&D spillovers occur between plants due to the R&D stock to which the 
plants have access. This allows us to investigate the geographic dimension of R&D spillovers in 
detail, taking into account the population of R&D-conducting firms in Japan, the plants of 
individual suppliers and customers, and the spatial configuration of these plants.  
 
We adopt the standard knowledge stock augmented production function framework (e.g. Hall et 
al., 2012). We define the production function of plant i operated by firm j as: 
 
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑖,𝐾𝑖 ,𝑀𝑖)𝑔�𝑅𝑓𝑖 ,𝑆𝑖, X𝑖�𝑈𝑖  (1) 
 
where: 
𝑄𝑖: Gross output of plant 𝑖 
𝐿𝑖 ,𝐾𝑖,𝑀𝑖: Inputs of plant 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
𝑅𝑓𝑖: Firm-level R&D stock available to plant 𝑖 (𝑓𝑖 denotes the firm plant 𝑖 belongs to) 
𝑆𝑖: R&D spillover pool due to all other plants in Japan X𝑖: a vector of observable firm and plant-level variables affecting plant productivity 
𝑈𝑖: plant-year specific unobserved efficiency influences 
 
Total factor productivity (TFP) is defined as: 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖 ≡
𝑄𝑖
𝑓(𝐿𝑖,𝐾𝑖,𝑀𝑖) = 𝑔�𝑅𝑓𝑖 ,𝑆𝑖,𝐗𝑖�𝑈𝑖        (2) 
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R&D stocks are assumed to influence production with a two-year lag to reflect that the 
application of new knowledge and insights due to R&D takes time.2 If we adopt a log-linear 
specification for 𝑔�𝑅𝑓𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖� and model 𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝜇𝑠𝑖+𝜀𝑖, we obtain: 
 ln𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖 = 𝛼𝑅 ln𝑅𝑓𝑖 + 𝛼𝑆 ln 𝑆𝑖 + 𝛼𝑋X𝑖 + 𝜇𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                             (3) 
 
where 𝜇𝑠𝑖 represents industry effects (with 𝑠𝑖 denoting the industry of plant 𝑖) and 𝜀𝑖 represents 
measurement error. 
 
R&D spillovers 𝑆𝑖 may stem from R&D conducted at technologically proximate plants and from 
R&D conducted by individual suppliers and customers. Each plant with access to parent firm 
R&D is a potential source of spillovers due to these exponents of technological or supplier-buyer 
relatedness. To avoid double counting of R&D stocks in cases in which firms operate multiple 
plants, we allocate firms’ R&D stocks to their plants based on the output share of the plant in the 
firm’s total production in Japan. The total spillover pool available to plant i of firm f is defined as 
the weighted sum of other all other firms’ R&D stocks in Japan: 
 
𝑆𝑖 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑖′𝑖′∈𝑃𝑓′𝑓′≠𝑓𝑖 𝑂𝑖′𝑂𝑓′ 𝑅𝑓′        (4) 
 
where 𝑇𝑓′ denotes the set of plants owned by firm𝑓′, 𝑤𝑖𝑖′  is the spillover weight of plant 𝑖′ to 
plant 𝑖, 𝑂𝑖′ is the output of plant 𝑖′, 𝑂𝑓′ is the total output of firm 𝑓′, and 𝑅𝑓′ is the R&D stock of 
firm 𝑓′. The spillover weight depends on technological relatedness between the industries of the 
plants 𝑖′ and i, 𝑇(𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑖′), the geographic distance between the plants, 𝑑𝑖𝑖′, and the presence of 
and type of buyer-supplier relationships between firms operating these plants, 𝐼𝑘�𝑓𝑖 ,  𝑓𝑖′�. We 
distinguish two types of capital relationships, as there may be asymmetry depending on which 
party is the controlling firm: suppliers or customers that are shareholders of the focal firm, and 
suppliers or customers in which the focal firm holds equity. We model this as follows: 
                                                   
2 The lag between firms’ own R&D investment and productivity is taken to be one year. Results are robust 
to the specific lag chosen. 
7 
 
 
𝑤𝑖𝑖′ = �1 −∑ 𝐼𝑘�𝑓𝑖 ,  𝑓𝑖′�𝑘 �𝑇�𝑠𝑖,  𝑠𝑖′�𝑒𝜏𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑖′ + ∑ 𝐼𝑘�𝑓𝑖,  𝑓𝑖′��𝑇�𝑠𝑖,  𝑠𝑖′� + 𝛿𝑘�𝑒𝜏𝑘𝑑𝑖𝑖′𝑘   (5) 
 
where 𝐼𝑘(𝑓𝑖 ,𝑓𝑖′) is an indicator function taking the value one in case of the following specific 
inter-firm relationships: 
• 𝐼𝑏𝑏�𝑓𝑖,  𝑓𝑖′� = 1 if the firm of plant 𝑖′ buys from and is not a shareholder of the firm of 
plant 𝑖 
• 𝐼𝑠𝑏�𝑓𝑖,  𝑓𝑖′� = 1 if the firm of plant 𝑖′ supplies and is not a shareholder of the firm of 
plant 𝑖  
• 𝐼𝑏ℎ�𝑓𝑖,  𝑓𝑖′� = 1 if the firm of plant 𝑖′ buys from and is a shareholder of the firm of plant 𝑖 
• 𝐼𝑠ℎ�𝑓𝑖 ,  𝑓𝑖′� = 1 if the firm of plant 𝑖′ supplies and is a shareholder of the firm of plant 𝑖. 
𝛿𝑘  is a parameter to be estimated reflecting the differential importance of specific plants 
belonging to parent firms with a specific buyer-supplier relationship type 𝑘 . 𝑑𝑖𝑖′  is the 
geographic distance between plant 𝑖 and plant 𝑖′. 𝜏𝑘  is a decay parameter to be estimated (with 
𝜏𝑘 < 0).  
 
Hence, in the absence of supplier or customer relationships ( 𝐼𝑘(𝑓𝑖,𝑓𝑖′) = 0  for all 𝑘 ), the 
spillover weight is just a function of technological proximity and distance (with distance decay 
parameter 𝜏𝑏); the estimated elasticity of productivity with respect to the R&D spillover pool is 
𝛼𝑆 in equation (3). In the presence of supplier or customer relationships, the model allows for an 
additional spillover effect 𝛿𝑘 (a spillover ‘mark-up’) on top of the ‘base’ effect of technological 
proximity, while simultaneously allowing differential geographic decay functions 𝜏𝑘. We expect 
the strongest spillovers from the ‘major’ firms in vertical chains: the suppliers or customers that 
are shareholders (e.g. Branstetter, 2000). We model an exponential decay function on the 
effectiveness of spillovers with parameter 𝜏 to be estimated, in line with recent studies (e.g. 
Lychagin et al. 2010). Distance d is the distance between a pair of locations and is measured as 
the geo-distance between the centre of cities, wards, towns, and villages. In order to correct for 
differences in the geographic areas covered by the regions, distance is the radius of the region if 
plants are located in the same region. 
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3. DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE 
We match plant-level data from the Japanese Census of Manufacturers with information on R&D 
expenditures from the yearly (comprehensive) Survey of R&D Activities in Japan, and 
information on buyer-supplier linkages in the database compiled by Tokyo Shoko Research 
(TSR, 2006). The manufacturing census comprehensively covers manufacturing plants with 
more than four employees. The Survey of R&D Activities in Japan is a comprehensive and 
mandatory survey of R&D-performing firms in Japan with a response rate of approximately 90 
per cent. Large firms (with more than 1 billion Yen in capital) are always included in the survey; 
smaller firms are included in the survey more frequently if they are identified as R&D-
conducting firms in the previous survey. In our analysis, we only include plants of firms 
responding to the R&D surveys, as we require valid information on firms’ own R&D 
expenditures or on the absence thereof. In terms of R&D spillover pools, we sought 
comprehensiveness by using the weights provided in the R&D survey to correct for non-response 
and to arrive at an estimate of total R&D expenditures in Japan and their distribution over 
locations. The TSR data was collected for the purpose of credit rating services. It identifies the 
most important buyers and suppliers of Japanese firms, with a maximum of 24. The 2006 version 
of the data represents the actual buyers and suppliers in 2005. By combining buyers and 
suppliers mentioned in the survey from both sides (buyers reporting suppliers and suppliers 
reporting buyers), the number of identified buyers and suppliers is further increased. We can 
match close to 12,000 firms in the TSR data to the R&D surveys. These firms operated more 
than 20,000 manufacturing plants in Japan in 2005. For about 40 per cent of the plant 
observations, plants are owned by parent firms for which we could confirm the absence of formal 
R&D.  
 
We utilize plant-level TFP data from the Japan Industrial Productivity Database (JIP) 2010 
(Fukao et al., 2008). TFP is measured using the index number method (see Belderbos et al., 
2013). One of the main advantages of the index number method is that it allows for 
heterogeneity in the production technology of individual firms, while other methods controlling 
for the endogeneity of inputs (e.g. Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) assume 
an identical production technology among firms within an industry (Van Biesebroeck, 2007; Aw 
et al., 2001). TFP data are calculated for 58 manufacturing industries (see Table 1). TFP data are 
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currently available up to the year 2007. R&D stocks are calculated via the perpetual inventory 
method. We use industry-specific depreciation rates to reflect differences in the speed of 
obsolescence and technology life cycles. Industry-specific depreciation rates are based on 
Japanese official surveys of the ‘life-span’ of technology conducted in 1986 and 2009 among 
R&D conducting firms 3  and vary between 8 (food industry) and 25 per cent (precision 
instruments). To calculate initial R&D stocks (Hall and Oriani, 2006), we similarly use industry-
specific growth rates, which we calculate from the R&D survey as average R&D growth rates 
per field in the 1980s. R&D investments are deflated using a deflator for private R&D from the 
JIP database, calculated from the price indices of the input factors for R&D expenditures for 
each industry. We calculate focal plant-level R&D stocks as the R&D stock of the parent, 
assuming that all parent firm R&D provides relevant productivity-improving inputs to the 
plants.4 Zero R&D cases are not compatible with the specification in natural logarithms in (3) 
but provide important variation in the sample. We deal with this by including for R&D 
engagement and by adding the value one to the R&D stock before taking the logarithm (e.g. 
Klette, 1996). When calculating R&D stocks by location and industry, we avoid double counting 
by allocating parent firms’ R&D stocks to their plants based on the output share of the plant in 
the total output of all the firm’s plants. We map R&D stocks across industries and space by using 
the information on the location of the plant, where we distinguish more than 1,800 cities, wards, 
towns, and villages, and the bilateral distances between these. Distance is measured as the geo-
distance between the centre of cities, wards, towns, and villages. In order to correct for 
differences in the geographic areas covered by the regions, distance is the radius of the region if 
plants are located in the same region. The technological relatedness measure is derived from 
patent data and based on Leten et al. (2007). The relatedness between technologies will be 
reflected in the intensity with which technologies in a field build on prior art in a different field. 
Patent citation data are available at the four-digit International Patent Classification (IPC) level. 
The IPC codes can subsequently be mapped onto industries using the industry-technology 
concordance table developed by Johnson (2002) in which each technology field is linked to 
                                                   
3 See “White Paper on Science and Technology” (1986, Science and Technology Agency) and “Survey on 
Research Activities of Private Corporations” (2009, National Institute of Science and Technology Policy). 
4 Given that R&D at the firm level is often organized to benefit from scope economies (e.g. Henderson 
and Cockburn, 1996; Argyres and Silverman, 2004) and involves active knowledge transfer to business 
units and plants, this may be a suitable assumption. 
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corresponding Japan Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes.  
 
The vector of plant- and firm-specific characteristics 𝐗𝑖 in equation (3) includes, in addition to 
parent R&D stock (in logs) and the dummy for positive R&D stock, plant size (number of 
employees), a dummy variable indicating whether the plant is active in multiple industries (at the 
four-digit level), a dummy taking the value one if the plant is exiting in the subsequent year, a 
dummy taking the value one if the plant was established the previous year, plant age, firm age, 
the number of firm employees, and the number of plants operated by the firm. The entry and exit 
dummies are included to control for unobserved plant heterogeneity (Adams and Jaffe, 1996). 
The models also include a set of industry dummies.  
 
Specification 
The empirical models relate TFP of the plants in 2007 to parent firm R&D in 2006 and R&D 
spillover stocks in 2005, with buyer-supplier relationships measured in 2005. Given that we only 
have one year in which we can measure buyer and supplier relationships, the analysis has to be 
limited to a cross section. Hence, equation (3) is estimated as a nonlinear regression model (due 
to the specification of the spillover pool exponential form of the distance effects and the 
differencing effects of the types of buyer-relationships5). We assume that the buyer and supplier 
relationships are relatively stable – which is not a demanding assumption for the two-year period 
we consider and given the relatively stable buyer supplier relationships in Japan.  
 
The cross-section specification and the inability to control for all unobserved heterogeneity make 
it difficult to interpret the estimates as causal relationships. In future work, we aim to identify the 
effects of supplier and buyer R&D spillovers through changes in R&D stocks by estimating a 
differenced equation. Identification will require sufficient change in these stocks or in the plants 
of buyers and suppliers embedding these R&D stocks (through entry and exits), or it will require 
potential changes due to plant entry and exits. Another and more onerous caveat is potential 
endogeneity through reverse causality. It is conceivable that the most productive buyers are 
                                                   
5 The distance decay parameters, 𝜏𝑘, and the parameter reflecting the relative importance of each type of 
the buyer-supplier relationships, 𝛿𝑘 , are estimated using a Taylor approximation. See Belderbos et al. 
(2013) for details. 
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attracted to suppliers with the highest R&D stocks and vice versa. In a supplementary analysis, 
however, we show that this is not the case in practice. Rather, existing productivity is negatively 
related to relationships with buyers and suppliers with both positive R&D stocks and the highest 
R&D stocks. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the distribution of plants over industries. The largest numbers of plants are active 
in miscellaneous foods, fabricated metals, special machinery, and motor vehicle parts. Supplier 
R&D stocks are highest in semiconductors, motor vehicles, and communication equipment. 
Customer parent stocks are generally higher and most prominent in electronics parts, 
semiconductors, miscellaneous machinery, communication equipment, electronic measurement 
equipment, and computers. The smallest customer and supplier R&D stocks are generally found 
in food industries, textiles, and cement. R&D stocks of capital ownership-related suppliers and 
buyers are most prominent in electronics equipment, semiconductors, other transportation, 
chemical fibres, and organic chemicals, electronics and semiconductors, communication 
equipment, electrical machinery, and motor vehicles (customers).  
 
Table 2 provides a set of descriptive statistics for the sample and variables. In addition to the 
variable descriptives for the focal plant and firms (the top panel), a comparison is made between 
two groups: 1) total numbers of suppliers in the TSR data and those suppliers and customers that 
are in manufacturing industries and can be linked to the census and 2) suppliers and customers 
with positive R&D stock providing R&D spillovers. The bottom panel describes the actual 
suppliers and customer R&D stock variables. Table 3 shows correlations between the variables. 
High correlations are generally only observed for variables that are not simultaneously included 
in the models (e.g. supplier R&D stock and affiliated supplier R&D stock). An exception is the 
correlation coefficient of 69 per cent between affiliated suppliers’ and customers’ R&D stocks. 
This correlation is due to the presence of vertically integrated core manufacturing firms 
controlling firms at both the supply and demand sides. In practice, this makes it difficult to 
identify the effects of all four capital stock-related buyers and suppliers. We will report results in 
the current paper with 1) suppliers (buyers) that are major shareholders of the focal firm (where 
we expect most directional knowledge flows) and 2) a broader definition of capital ties with 
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R&D stocks of suppliers (buyers) that are either affiliated firms controlled by the focal firm or 
major shareholders of the focal firm. 
 
Figure 1 shows the distance between the focal plants and R&D conducting plants providing 
potential R&D spillovers. The median distance from supplier and buyer plants is about 170 
kilometres, half the distance from other manufacturing plants. For those plants operated by R&D 
investing firms, the median distance is smaller, at 115 kilometres. Roughly half of these plants 
are located within a 100-kilometre radius.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 4 shows the results of the models distinguishing generic spillovers, spillovers from 
suppliers and buyers, and spillovers from buyers and suppliers that are a major shareholder of the 
focal firm. Model 1 only contains general R&D spillovers and Models 2-5 add specific 
spillovers. In Model 1, the coefficient for parent R&D suggests an elasticity of TFP with respect 
to R&D of 0.021 per cent, which is at the lower end of the plant-level elasticities estimated in 
earlier work (Adams and Jaffe, 1996; Belderbos et al. 2013). The elasticity of the private R&D 
stock is lower at 0.007 per cent, while spillover effects decay with distance, as the significant 
distance parameter suggests. The coefficient for the private R&D stock increases to 0.015 when 
the models contain more detail regarding the source of spillovers and include a separate distance 
coefficient for buyers and suppliers. Model 3 shows that there is a spillover premium if R&D 
stocks belong to buyers or suppliers and that the effects of these spillovers do not decay with 
distance. Model 4 suggests that supplier spillovers have the highest premium; Model 5 indicates 
that spillovers of supplying firms that are shareholders of the focal firm result in by far the 
highest productivity effects. The control variable indicates a positive relationship between 
productivity and recent entry and a negative association with multi-plant firms, the number of 
other plants of the firm, subsequent exit, and plant age (in its squared form). Firm age has an 
inverted-u shaped relationship with productivity.  
 
Table 5 focuses on the role of spillovers from affiliated firms rather than shareholding firms. As 
discussed above, since relationships with affiliated firms occur often simultaneously with 
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suppliers and with buyers (a feature of larger firms controlling the vertical chain), we aggregate 
supplier and buyer spillovers in this case. The results indicate that while spillovers from 
shareholders are about twice as large, spillovers from affiliated firms also play an important role 
and feature a significant and large premium.  
 
The decay function for spillovers from plants that are not buyers or suppliers, based on the 
results in Table 4, Model 5, is depicted in Figure 2. Spillover effects decline and become 
negligible at about 300 kilometres. This pattern suggests somewhat stronger decay effects 
compared to the estimates reported in Belderbos et al. (2013) for Japanese plants and in Lychagin 
et al. (2010) for U.S.-listed manufacturing firms based on inventor locations. One explanation for 
the stronger estimated decay effects is that the separate estimation of distance effects due to 
buyer and supplier spillovers, brings the remaining R&D spillover variable closer to a ‘pure’ 
spillover measure unaffected by transactional transfers. Pure spillovers tend to occur in closer 
vicinity.  
 
 
Supplementary analysis 
We modelled the spillovers from buyers and suppliers as additive to the effect of technological 
proximity. An alternative specification is to model these as multiplicative. The choice between 
the two is not trivial: in the latter case, the assumption is that the effect of buyers and suppliers 
spillovers is strongly reduced if the buyer and supplier industries share no specific technologies. 
In general, we found much weaker effects in this specification, indicating that productivity gains 
can occur in the absence of technological proximity, as long as there is relational proximity. 
 
We also addressed the issue of endogenous ‘matching’ of suppliers and buyers. In an auxiliary 
regression, buyer and supplier R&D stocks were regressed on the focal firm’s past TFP and two 
sets of industry dummies - for the focal plant and for the industry of the buyer (supplier). 
Empirical results reported in Table 6 strongly suggest that there is negative, rather than a 
positive, effect of prior TFP on the likelihood that the firm’s buyer or supplier invests in R&D, 
and on the level of the R&D stock of buyers and suppliers. Although this is a surprising pattern 
that invites further investigation in future work, it does suggest that the estimated R&D spillover 
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effects of buyers and suppliers are not likely to be biased by reverse causality.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The role of buyers and suppliers has received little attention in the literature on R&D spillovers 
and productivity, which has focused primarily on the moderating roles of technological and 
geographic proximity. In this paper, we have examined R&D spillovers due to buyer and supplier 
relationships at the transaction level, utilizing a unique dataset identifying individual buyers and 
suppliers of Japanese manufacturing firms, matched with data from the census of manufacturers 
and R&D surveys. In an analysis of more than 20,000 Japanese manufacturing plants, we find 
that R&D stocks of buyers and suppliers provide a substantial productivity performance 
premium over and above the effect of technologically and geographically proximate R&D 
stocks. These effects are magnified if the supplier and buyer have business group ties based on 
capital ownership relationships. The strongest such effects are observed for spillovers from 
buyers of suppliers that are the ‘core’ firms in the vertical chain and are shareholders of the focal 
firm. The latter finding is consistent with prior findings for the automobile and electronics 
industries in Japan (e.g. Branstetter, 2000; Suzuki, 1993). While distance is likely to affect the 
likelihood that transaction relationships occur, as exemplified by geographically concentrated 
buyer and supplier plants, given that transactions take place, distance no longer attenuates 
knowledge spillovers. We confirmed that the associations we find are not driven by a matching 
process in which the more productive firms tie up with R&D intensive suppliers and customers. 
Our results identify transaction-based spillovers as key influences on productivity and social 
returns to R&D.  
 
We envisage addressing a number of specification issues and undertaking supplementary 
analyses in future work, of which we mention three. First, we aim to assess the magnitude of 
buyer and supplier spillovers compared to R&D spillovers from other plants by performing a 
decomposition analysis. While the effects of (capital-related) buyer and supplier spillovers are 
large, such relationships are also relatively rare compared with the spillovers from the population 
of (technologically proximate) plants. It is then of interest to gain insight into the overall 
contribution of supplier- and buyer-related spillovers to productivity. Second, it may be of 
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interest to investigate potential spillovers from capital relationships in the absence of supplier or 
buyer ties. Third, we aim to perform a sensitivity analysis related to the likely imperfect coverage 
of buyer and supplier relationships in the TSR data, e.g. by limiting the analysis to firms with a 
minimum number of suppliers and buyers or by including indicators regarding the presence of 
limited information in the TSR data. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adams, J. D. & Jaffe, A. B., 1996. Bounding the Effects of R&D: An Investigation Using 
Matched Establish-Firm Data, RAND Journal of Economics, 27, pp.700-721. 
Aldieri, L. & Cincera, M., 2009. Geographic and Technological R&D Spillovers within the 
Triad: Micro Evidence from US Patents. Journal of Technology Transfer, 34(2), pp.196-
211. 
Argyres, N. & Silverman, B., 2004. R&D, Organization Structure, and the Development of 
Corporate Technological Knowledge. Strategic Management Journal, 25, pp.929-958. 
Aw, B. Y., Chen, X. & Roberts, M. J., 2001. Firm-level Evidence on Productivity Differentials 
and Turnover in Taiwanese Manufacturing. Journal of Development Economics, 66, 
pp.51-86. 
Belderbos, R. & Grimpe, C., 2012. Learning by Exporting, Learning by Non-Exporting, paper 
presented at the Academy of Management Conference, 2012.  
Belderbos, R., Gilsing, V., Lokshin, B. 2012, Persistence of, and interrelation between horizontal 
and vertical technology alliances, Journal of Management, 38(6), 1788-1811. 
Belderbos, R., Wakasugi, R., and Zou J., 2012. Network Effects in Capital Goods Trade: Japanese 
Business Groups and the Import Behaviour of Foreign Affiliates, Journal of the Japanese and 
International Economies, 26 (2), 187-200. 
Belderbos, R., Carree, M. & Lokshin, B., 2004. Cooperative R&D and ﬁrm performance, 
Research Policy, 33(10), pp.1477-1492. 
Belderbos. R., Ikeuchi, K., Fukao, K., Kim, Y. G. & Kwon, H. U., 2013.  Plant Productivity 
Dynamics and Private and Public R&D Spillovers: Technological, Geographic and 
Relational Proximity. CEI Working Paper Series No. 2013-05. 
Bloom, N., Schankerman, M. & Van Reenen, J., 2013. Identifying Technology Spillovers and 
Product Market Rivalry. Econometrica, 81(4), pp.1347-1393. 
Branstetter, L., 2000. Vertical Keiretsu and Knowledge Spillovers in Japanese Manufacturing: 
An Empirical Assessment. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 14(2), 
pp.73-104. 
Crespi, G., Criscuolo, C., & Haskel, J., 2008. Productivity, Eexporting and the Llearning by 
Eexporting Hhypothesis: Ddirect Eevidence from UK firms. Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 41 (2), pp. 619-638. 
16 
 
Duranton, G. & Overman, H. G., 2005. Testing for Localization Using Micro-Geographic 
Analysis. Review of Economic Studies, 72(4), pp.1077-1106. 
Feldman, M. P. & Lichtenberg, F. R., 1998. The Impact and Organization of Publicly-Funded 
Research and Development in the European Community. Annales d'Économie et de 
Statistique, 49/50, pp.199-222. 
Fukao, K, Kim, Y. G. & Kwon. H. U., 2008. Plant Turnover and TFP Dynamics in Japanese 
Manufacturing. In A. Heshmati & J.-D. Lee (eds.), Micro-Evidence for Dynamics of 
Industrial Evolution, Nova Science Publishers, Inc., Ch. 3, pp.23-59.  
Görg, H. & Strobl, E., 2001. Multinational Companies and Productivity Spillovers: A Meta- 
Analysis. The Economic Journal, 111(475), pp.F723-F739. 
Goto, A. & Suzuki, K., 1989. R&D Capital, Rate of Return on R&D Investment and Spillover of 
R&D in Japanese Manufacturing Industries. Review of Economics and Statistics, 71, pp. 
555-564.  
Griffith, R., Redding, S., & Simpson, H., 2009. Technological Catch-up and Geographic 
Proximity. Journal of Regional Science, 49, pp.689-720. 
Griliches, Z., 1992, The Search for R&D Spillovers, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 94, 
pp.29-47.  
Hall, B. H. & Oriani R., 2006. Does the Market Value R&D Investment by European Firms? 
Evidence from a Panel of Manufacturing Firms in France, Germany, and Italy. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 5, pp.971-993. 
Hall, B. H., Mairesse, J. & Mohnen, P., 2012. Measuring the Returns to R&D. In B. Hall & N. 
Rosenberg (eds.), Handbooks in Economics: Economics of Innovation Volume 2. North-
Holland, pp.1034-1074. 
Haskel, J., Pereira, S. & Slaughter, M., 2007. Does Inward Foreign Investment Boost the 
Productivity of Domestic Firms? The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(3), pp.482-
496. 
Henderson, R. & Cockburn, I., 1996. Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: The Determinants of 
Research Productivity in Drug Discovery. Rand Journal of Economics, 27, pp.31-59. 
Isaksson, H.D., Simeth, M. & Seifert, R.W., 2014. Knowledge Spillovers in the Supply Chain: 
Evidence from High Tech Sectors, Working Paper, EPFL. 
Jaffe, A. B., Trajtenberg, M. & Henderson, R., 1993. Geographic Localization of Knowledge 
Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, pp.577-
598. 
Javorcik, B. S., 2004. Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic 
Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages. American Economic Review, 
94(3), pp.605-627. 
Johnson, D. K., 2002. The OECD Technology Concordance (OTC): Patents by Industry of 
Manufacture and Sector of Use, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 
2002/5, OECD Publishing 
17 
 
Keller, W., 2004. International Technology Diffusion, Journal of Economic Literature, XLII, 
752-782. 
Kugler, M., 2006. Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment: Within or Between Industries? 
Journal of Development Economics, 80, pp.444-477. 
Klette, T. J., 1996. R&D, Scope Economics, and Plant Performance. Rand Journal of Economics, 
27, pp.502-522. 
Klette, T. J. & Johansen, F., 1998. Accumulation of R&D Capital and Dynamic Firm 
Performance: A Not-so-fixed Effect Model. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 49/50, 
pp.389-419.  
Leten, B., Belderbos, R. & Van Looy, B., 2007. Technological Diversification, Coherence, and 
Performance of Firms. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 24(6), pp.567–579.  
Levinsohn, J. & Petrin, A., 2003. Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control for 
Unobservables. Review of Economic Studies, 70, pp.317-341. 
Lychagin, S., Pinkse, J., Slade, M. E. & Van Reenen, J., 2010. Spillovers in Space: Does 
Geography Matter? NBER Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Mairesse, J. & Mulkay, B., 2008. An Exploration of Local R&D Spillovers in France. NBER 
Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Olley, S. & Pakes, A., 1996. The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications 
Equipment Industry. Econometrica, 64, pp.1263-1297. 
Orlando, M., 2004. Measuring Spillovers from Industrial R&D: On the Importance of 
Geographic and Technology Proximity. Rand Journal of Economics, 35, pp.777-786. 
Suzuki, K., 1993. R&D Spillovers and Technology Transfer mong and within Vertical Keiretsu 
Groups: Evidence from the Japanese Electrical Machinery Industry. International Journal 
of Industrial Organization, 11(4), pp. 573-591. 
Teece, D. J., 1977. Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost of 
Transferring Technological Know-how, Economic Journal, 87(346), pp.242-61. 
Todo, Y., Matous, P. & Inoue, H., 2015. The Strength of Long Ties and the Weakness of Strong 
Ties: Knowledge Diffusion through Supply Chain Networks, RIETI Discussion Paper 
Series, mimeo. 
Van Biesebroeck, J., 2007. Robustness of Productivity Estimates. Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 55(3), pp.529-569. 
  
18 
 
Ta
bl
e 
1.
 S
am
pl
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
 
  
 
N
um
be
r 
of
 
un
iq
ue
 
pl
an
ts 
N
um
be
r 
of
 
un
iq
ue
 
fir
m
s 
To
ta
l 
R
&
D
 
st
oc
k 
 
(b
ill
io
n 
ye
n)
 
A
vg
. #
 o
f m
aj
or
 b
us
in
es
s p
ar
tn
er
s w
ith
 R
&
D
 st
oc
k 
To
ta
l R
&
D
 st
oc
k 
of
 m
aj
or
 b
us
in
es
s p
ar
tn
er
s (
bi
lli
on
 y
en
) 
In
du
st
ry
 (J
IP
 in
du
st
ry
 c
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n)
 
B
uy
er
 -
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r  
B
uy
er
 - 
af
fil
ia
te
d 
B
uy
er
 - 
no
 
ca
pi
ta
l 
tie
s 
Su
pp
lie
r -
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
Su
pp
lie
r -
 
af
fil
ia
te
d 
Su
pp
lie
r -
 
no
 c
ap
ita
l 
tie
s 
B
uy
er
 -
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
B
uy
er
 - 
af
fil
ia
te
d 
B
uy
er
 - 
no
 
ca
pi
ta
l t
ie
s 
Su
pp
lie
r -
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
Su
pp
lie
r -
 
af
fil
ia
te
d 
Su
pp
lie
r -
 
no
 c
ap
ita
l 
tie
s 
8 L
iv
es
to
ck
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
51
7 
36
5 
35
3 
0.
2 
0.
0 
1.
1 
0.
2 
0.
0 
3.
5 
5 
0 
21
 
5 
0 
77
 
9 S
ea
fo
od
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
36
3 
31
0 
51
 
0.
1 
0.
0 
0.
9 
0.
1 
0.
0 
1.
2 
0 
0 
13
 
1 
0 
33
 
10
 Fl
ou
r a
nd
 g
ra
in
 m
ill
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
55
 
48
 
28
 
0.
1 
0.
0 
1.
5 
0.
1 
0.
0 
1.
7 
1 
0 
5 
0 
0 
8 
11
 M
isc
el
la
ne
ou
s f
oo
ds
 a
nd
 re
la
te
d 
pr
od
uc
ts 
1,
88
6 
1,
44
6 
1,
55
2 
0.
1 
0.
0 
1.
0 
0.
1 
0.
1 
2.
0 
18
 
0 
15
8 
15
 
1 
28
2 
12
 Pr
ep
ar
ed
 a
ni
m
al
 fo
od
s a
nd
 o
rg
an
ic
 fe
rti
liz
er
s 
52
 
38
 
47
 
0.
1 
0.
1 
1.
4 
0.
1 
0.
1 
2.
1 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
11
 
13
 B
ev
er
ag
es
 
32
0 
24
1 
81
5 
0.
1 
0.
1 
1.
3 
0.
0 
0.
2 
4.
7 
5 
0 
53
 
3 
1 
12
4 
14
 To
ba
cc
o 
16
 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
15
 Te
xt
ile
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
61
6 
52
6 
36
7 
0.
1 
0.
1 
1.
7 
0.
1 
0.
1 
1.
3 
18
 
0 
30
1 
13
 
0 
91
 
18
 Pu
lp
, p
ap
er
, a
nd
 c
oa
te
d 
an
d 
gl
az
ed
 p
ap
er
 
19
2 
14
1 
41
4 
0.
2 
0.
3 
3.
8 
0.
2 
0.
4 
3.
0 
2 
1 
14
3 
4 
1 
25
 
19
 Pa
pe
r p
ro
du
ct
s 
70
8 
55
0 
49
0 
0.
1 
0.
0 
4.
8 
0.
1 
0.
0 
1.
7 
6 
0 
1,
05
1 
6 
0 
16
4 
20
 Pr
in
tin
g,
 p
la
te
 m
ak
in
g 
fo
r p
rin
tin
g 
an
d 
bo
ok
bi
nd
in
g 
1,
12
3 
97
7 
63
8 
0.
1 
0.
1 
3.
9 
0.
1 
0.
1 
2.
4 
39
 
0 
1,
53
0 
23
 
3 
50
8 
22
 R
ub
be
r p
ro
du
ct
s 
34
1 
25
9 
1,
13
8 
0.
2 
0.
1 
4.
6 
0.
2 
0.
2 
2.
8 
66
 
0 
1,
35
4 
15
 
1 
66
 
23
 C
he
m
ic
al
 fe
rti
liz
er
s 
28
 
20
 
23
 
0.
3 
0.
1 
1.
4 
0.
6 
0.
1 
1.
4 
2 
0 
9 
3 
0 
4 
24
 B
as
ic
 in
or
ga
ni
c 
ch
em
ic
al
s 
16
4 
13
6 
95
8 
0.
3 
0.
3 
4.
4 
0.
3 
0.
3 
2.
3 
24
 
0 
27
7 
22
 
0 
45
 
25
 B
as
ic
 o
rg
an
ic
 c
he
m
ic
al
s 
6 
6 
64
6 
0.
3 
5.
5 
24
.0
 
0.
3 
3.
3 
16
.2
 
0 
1 
11
 
0 
0 
3 
26
 O
rg
an
ic
 c
he
m
ic
al
s 
30
3 
23
1 
4,
68
6 
0.
4 
1.
3 
8.
1 
0.
4 
0.
8 
5.
7 
54
 
9 
33
6 
47
 
2 
14
2 
27
 C
he
m
ic
al
 fi
be
rs
 
22
 
20
 
99
8 
0.
3 
2.
8 
8.
4 
0.
3 
2.
1 
8.
6 
2 
1 
15
 
3 
0 
7 
28
 M
isc
el
la
ne
ou
s c
he
m
ic
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
55
3 
43
7 
4,
20
0 
0.
2 
0.
4 
5.
0 
0.
2 
0.
3 
4.
4 
49
 
4 
80
8 
43
 
2 
21
3 
29
 Ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
31
3 
25
4 
5,
51
3 
0.
2 
0.
3 
3.
6 
0.
2 
0.
4 
5.
0 
31
 
3 
21
4 
19
 
4 
12
4 
30
 Pe
tro
le
um
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
44
 
33
 
32
5 
0.
2 
0.
1 
6.
4 
0.
1 
0.
1 
4.
3 
2 
0 
12
0 
0 
0 
10
 
31
 C
oa
l p
ro
du
ct
s 
15
 
14
 
34
7 
0.
2 
1.
1 
7.
4 
0.
3 
0.
7 
4.
0 
2 
1 
15
 
2 
0 
3 
32
 G
la
ss
 a
nd
 it
s p
ro
du
ct
s 
21
8 
16
1 
70
4 
0.
4 
0.
5 
5.
2 
0.
3 
0.
4 
2.
8 
47
 
1 
52
9 
13
 
1 
66
 
33
 C
em
en
t a
nd
 it
s p
ro
du
ct
s 
29
6 
20
2 
54
7 
0.
1 
0.
5 
2.
6 
0.
2 
0.
4 
2.
4 
2 
1 
74
 
11
 
1 
36
 
34
 Po
tte
ry
 
91
 
73
 
69
0 
0.
1 
0.
3 
3.
6 
0.
1 
0.
4 
3.
9 
1 
0 
19
2 
1 
0 
46
 
35
 M
isc
el
la
ne
ou
s c
er
am
ic
, s
to
ne
, a
nd
 c
la
y 
pr
od
uc
ts 
28
2 
23
1 
84
9 
0.
3 
0.
2 
3.
9 
0.
2 
0.
2 
1.
7 
20
 
0 
55
3 
10
 
0 
48
 
36
 Pi
g 
iro
n 
an
d 
cr
ud
e 
st
ee
l 
60
 
45
 
1,
25
5 
0.
4 
3.
0 
7.
1 
0.
2 
3.
7 
13
.8
 
31
 
2 
18
7 
9 
2 
18
 
37
 M
isc
el
la
ne
ou
s i
ro
n 
an
d 
ste
el
 
68
2 
58
0 
1,
58
2 
0.
2 
0.
3 
4.
0 
0.
1 
0.
3 
2.
2 
98
 
2 
1,
40
4 
58
 
2 
15
8 
38
 Sm
el
tin
g 
an
d 
re
fin
in
g 
of
 n
on
-fe
rro
us
 m
et
al
s 
85
 
70
 
45
9 
0.
4 
0.
9 
6.
3 
0.
3 
0.
6 
2.
8 
6 
0 
40
0 
4 
0 
83
 
39
 N
on
-fe
rr
ou
s m
et
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
42
1 
35
0 
1,
47
4 
0.
3 
0.
5 
4.
7 
0.
3 
0.
4 
2.
3 
92
 
2 
1,
13
1 
33
 
1 
14
1 
40
 Fa
br
ic
at
ed
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
na
l a
nd
 a
rc
hi
te
ct
ur
al
 m
et
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
75
4 
66
8 
49
6 
0.
1 
0.
0 
2.
5 
0.
1 
0.
0 
1.
8 
15
 
0 
74
3 
16
 
0 
13
8 
41
 M
isc
el
la
ne
ou
s f
ab
ric
at
ed
 m
et
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
1,
55
1 
1,
32
9 
87
8 
0.
1 
0.
1 
4.
3 
0.
1 
0.
1 
1.
1 
11
9 
3 
4,
04
0 
28
 
1 
38
9 
42
 G
en
er
al
 in
du
st
ry
 m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 
84
3 
77
6 
9,
11
0 
0.
1 
0.
2 
4.
6 
0.
1 
0.
3 
4.
1 
15
7 
22
 
2,
48
3 
57
 
7 
37
6 
43
 Sp
ec
ia
l i
nd
us
try
 m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 
1,
50
1 
1,
38
8 
8,
58
5 
0.
1 
0.
1 
3.
6 
0.
1 
0.
1 
2.
3 
18
5 
8 
3,
95
2 
85
 
3 
48
4 
44
 M
isc
el
la
ne
ou
s m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 
80
2 
72
8 
3,
40
4 
0.
2 
0.
0 
4.
1 
0.
1 
0.
1 
1.
4 
92
 
1 
2,
62
0 
30
 
1 
18
2 
45
 O
ffi
ce
 a
nd
 se
rv
ic
e 
in
du
str
y 
m
ac
hi
ne
s 
32
8 
30
1 
8,
46
1 
0.
2 
0.
3 
4.
1 
0.
1 
0.
3 
5.
0 
56
 
16
 
82
5 
61
 
8 
21
2 
46
 El
ec
tri
ca
l g
en
er
at
in
g,
 tr
an
sm
is
sio
n,
 d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
an
d 
in
du
st
ria
l a
pp
ar
at
us
 
91
3 
78
4 
6,
23
7 
0.
2 
0.
2 
3.
7 
0.
2 
0.
3 
3.
8 
28
4 
4 
3,
07
1 
21
3 
6 
69
6 
47
 H
ou
se
ho
ld
 e
le
ct
ric
 a
pp
lia
nc
es
 
18
1 
16
6 
4,
39
2 
0.
1 
0.
8 
6.
3 
0.
1 
0.
8 
10
.6
 
25
 
27
 
69
9 
29
 
15
 
23
6 
48
 El
ec
tro
ni
c 
da
ta
 p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
m
ac
hi
ne
s, 
di
gi
ta
l a
nd
 a
na
lo
g 
co
m
pu
te
r e
qu
ip
m
en
t a
nd
 a
cc
es
so
rie
s 
16
8 
16
1 
4,
78
8 
0.
3 
0.
2 
3.
8 
0.
2 
0.
3 
3.
9 
12
4 
6 
59
9 
90
 
3 
20
1 
49
 C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
eq
ui
pm
en
t 
26
4 
23
5 
12
,9
28
 
0.
3 
0.
6 
4.
9 
0.
2 
0.
7 
10
.3
 
10
4 
23
 
94
7 
78
 
13
 
43
6 
50
 El
ec
tro
ni
c 
eq
ui
pm
en
t a
nd
 e
le
ct
ric
 m
ea
su
rin
g 
in
str
um
en
ts 
28
5 
27
2 
4,
28
8 
0.
2 
0.
3 
5.
4 
0.
1 
0.
3 
5.
1 
95
 
16
 
1,
50
0 
70
 
9 
23
9 
51
 Se
m
ic
on
du
ct
or
 d
ev
ic
es
 a
nd
 in
te
gr
at
ed
 c
irc
ui
ts 
18
3 
14
4 
7,
81
5 
0.
3 
0.
9 
4.
6 
0.
3 
1.
1 
13
.3
 
10
7 
9 
66
6 
85
 
7 
30
7 
52
 El
ec
tro
ni
c 
pa
rts
 
93
4 
79
7 
10
,7
00
 
0.
2 
0.
1 
4.
3 
0.
2 
0.
2 
3.
3 
20
8 
9 
3,
91
2 
14
8 
6 
72
3 
53
 M
isc
el
la
ne
ou
s e
le
ct
ric
al
 m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t 
26
6 
21
9 
6,
68
4 
0.
3 
0.
3 
4.
9 
0.
2 
0.
4 
6.
8 
12
9 
7 
90
1 
46
 
5 
22
2 
54
 M
ot
or
 v
eh
ic
le
s 
11
9 
94
 
11
,7
07
 
0.
4 
1.
4 
3.
4 
0.
3 
3.
3 
24
.6
 
15
3 
13
 
23
2 
10
2 
35
 
24
9 
55
 M
ot
or
 v
eh
ic
le
 p
ar
ts
 a
nd
 a
cc
es
so
rie
s 
1,
56
1 
1,
17
5 
15
,0
36
 
0.
4 
0.
2 
4.
0 
0.
3 
0.
5 
4.
3 
1,
24
5 
27
 
5,
14
5 
56
4 
54
 
1,
18
8 
56
 O
th
er
 tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
eq
ui
pm
en
t 
32
1 
28
4 
2,
59
7 
0.
2 
0.
4 
3.
2 
0.
2 
0.
6 
8.
8 
55
 
14
 
66
8 
92
 
4 
37
3 
57
 Pr
ec
is
io
n 
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 &
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t 
46
0 
40
3 
2,
91
6 
0.
2 
0.
1 
3.
1 
0.
1 
0.
1 
2.
3 
86
 
1 
1,
39
0 
21
 
0 
19
3 
19 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
Variables Mean S.D. Median Min. 25% 75% Max. 
 TFP (ln.) 0.157 0.466 0.046 -3.126 -0.102 0.266 3.269 
 Parent R&D stock (ln.) 0.973 2.024 0.000 -3.653 0.000 0.000 10.751 
 Parent R&D > 0 (dummy) 0.247 0.431 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Unmatched buyers and suppliers 0.507 0.212 0.500 0.000 0.357 0.670 0.962 
 Number of other plants (ln.) 0.565 0.718 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.099 3.555 
 Number of firm employees (ln.) 4.955 1.195 4.682 3.401 4.043 5.557 11.133 
 Number of plant employees (ln.) 4.530 0.858 4.344 3.401 3.871 4.984 9.298 
 Multi-products plants (4 digit, dummy) 0.543 0.498 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 Plant age 21.126 7.383 26.000 2.000 17.000 26.000 26.000 
 Firm age 23.212 5.940 26.000 2.000 25.000 26.000 26.000 
 Entry plant (dummy) 0.010 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Closing plant (dummy) 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Number of major business partners (all)        
 Buyer 62.3 279.3 11.0 0.0 6.0 23.0 4647.0 
 Supplier 79.8 432.3 12.0 0.0 6.0 25.0 7488.0 
 Buyer - no capital ties 59.2 268.3 11.0 0.0 5.0 21.0 4587.0 
 Supplier - no capital ties 77.0 422.2 11.0 0.0 6.0 24.0 7459.0 
 Buyer or supplier - shareholder 0.6 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 12.0 
 Buyer or supplier - affiliated 5.2 26.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 398.0 
 Buyer - shareholder 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 8.0 
 Buyer - affiliated 2.8 15.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 293.0 
 Supplier - shareholder 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 
 Supplier - affiliated 2.4 11.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 176.0 
 Both buyer and supplier (two-way) 7.0 33.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 562.0 
 Buyer or supplier with two-way capital ties 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 
 Not buyer or supplier - shareholder 0.9 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 13.0 
 Not buyer or supplier - affiliated 2.0 10.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 271.0 
Number of major business partners in the Census for Manufacturers     
 Buyer 16.2 58.2 6.0 0.0 2.0 11.0 1347.0 
 Supplier 29.0 134.3 5.0 0.0 3.0 12.0 2423.0 
 Buyer - no capital ties 15.1 55.8 5.0 0.0 2.0 10.0 1313.0 
 Supplier - no capital ties 27.8 131.1 5.0 0.0 2.0 11.0 2392.0 
 Buyer or supplier - shareholder 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 
 Buyer or supplier - affiliated 1.9 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 109.0 
 Buyer - shareholder 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 
 Buyer - affiliated 0.9 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 85.0 
 Supplier - shareholder 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 
 Supplier - affiliated 1.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 74.0 
 Not buyer or supplier - shareholder 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 
 Not buyer or supplier - affiliated 0.5 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 116.0 
 
  
20 
 
Table 2 (continued) 
Variables Mean S.D. Median Min. 25% 75% Max. 
Number of major business partners with positive R&D stock      
 Buyer 4.0 7.6 2.0 0.0 1.0 5.0 125.0 
 Supplier 3.7 14.9 1.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 214.0 
 Buyer - no capital ties 3.6 6.8 2.0 0.0 1.0 5.0 123.0 
 Supplier - no capital ties 3.3 13.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 199.0 
 Buyer or supplier - shareholder 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 
 Buyer or supplier - affiliated 0.5 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 73.0 
 Buyer - shareholder 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 
 Buyer - affiliated 0.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 
 Supplier - shareholder 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 
 Supplier - affiliated 0.3 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 57.0 
 Not buyer or supplier - shareholder 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 
 Not buyer or supplier - affiliated 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29.0 
Plants having a major business partner with positive R&D stock    
 Buyer 0.854 0.353 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 Supplier 0.704 0.457 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 Buyer - no capital ties 0.783 0.412 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 Supplier - no capital ties 0.646 0.478 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 Buyer or supplier - shareholder 0.207 0.405 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Buyer or supplier - affiliated 0.073 0.261 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Buyer - shareholder 0.175 0.380 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Buyer - affiliated 0.057 0.233 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Supplier - shareholder 0.139 0.346 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Supplier - affiliated 0.063 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Not buyer or supplier - shareholder 0.072 0.258 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 Not buyer or supplier - affiliated 0.059 0.236 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Total R&D stock of the major business partner (1 billion yen)      
 Buyer 2.329 4.577 0.272 0.000 0.012 2.420 40.965 
 Supplier 0.555 1.595 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.345 31.825 
 Buyer - no capital ties 2.136 4.360 0.194 0.000 0.002 2.047 38.403 
 Supplier - no capital ties 0.443 1.368 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.264 31.825 
 Buyer or supplier - shareholder 0.285 1.565 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 22.281 
 Buyer or supplier - affiliated 0.021 0.318 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.202 
 Buyer - shareholder 0.182 1.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.105 
 Buyer - affiliated 0.011 0.178 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.327 
 Supplier - shareholder 0.103 0.703 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.943 
 Supplier - affiliated 0.009 0.168 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.902 
 Not buyer or supplier - shareholder 0.053 0.527 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.777 
 Not buyer or supplier - affiliated 0.005 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.705 
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Table 4. TFP and buyer-supplier R&D spillovers: unrelated buyers/suppliers vs. shareholders 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
τ (distance parameter)      all other firms -0.013 -0.003    
 [0.00769]* [0.00189]*    all firms - no supplier/customer relation   -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
   [0.00506]** [0.00503]** [0.00473]** all suppliers and customers   0.000 0.000 0.000 
   [0.00093] [0.00092] [0.00085] 
δ  (spillover ‘markup’)      all suppliers and customers  305.028 1.798   
  [0.00000]*** [0.00054]***   all suppliers    4.180  
    [0.00053]***  all customers    1.637  
    [0.00130]***  suppliers - shareholders     46.548 
     [0.00003]*** suppliers - affiliated or no capital ties     2.865 
     [0.00096]*** customers - shareholders     2.528 
     [0.00007]*** customers - affiliated or no capital ties     1.869 
     [0.00094]*** R&D stock elasticity:      Parent R&D stock 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
 [0.00230]*** [0.00230]*** [0.00231]*** [0.00231]*** [0.00231]*** R&D spillover stock 0.007 0.007 0.014 0.015 0.015 
 [0.00203]*** [0.00116]*** [0.00267]*** [0.00273]*** [0.00263]*** Other parameters:      Parent R&D stock > 0 (dummy) 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 [0.00815] [0.00813] [0.00814] [0.00814] [0.00815] Number of other plants  -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 
 [0.00481]* [0.00482]** [0.00482]** [0.00482]** [0.00481]** Multi-products (4-digit) plant (dummy) -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
 [0.00357]*** [0.00357]*** [0.00357]*** [0.00357]*** [0.00357]*** Number of plant employees -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 [0.00495] [0.00495] [0.00495] [0.00495] [0.00496] Entry plant (dummy) 0.050 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.050 
 [0.02536]* [0.02540]* [0.02539]* [0.02539]* [0.02538]** Plant age 0.171 0.164 0.165 0.166 0.170 
 [0.03894]*** [0.03896]*** [0.03893]*** [0.03892]*** [0.03891]*** Plant age squared -0.032 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.032 
 [0.00803]*** [0.00803]*** [0.00802]*** [0.00802]*** [0.00802]*** Firm age -0.170 -0.162 -0.162 -0.162 -0.165 
 [0.04371]*** [0.04380]*** [0.04378]*** [0.04378]*** [0.04374]*** Firm age squared 0.032 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031 
 [0.00906]*** [0.00908]*** [0.00908]*** [0.00907]*** [0.00907]*** Closing plant (dummy) -0.023 -0.030 -0.030 -0.032 -0.030 
 [0.00881]*** [0.00898]*** [0.00885]*** [0.00890]*** [0.00877]*** Constant 0.039 0.022 -0.096 -0.104 -0.113 
 [0.05901] [0.04976] [0.06987] [0.07087] [0.06910] Industry dummies (JIP industry level) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# observations 21206 21206 21206 21206 21206 
R-squared 0.7052 0.7055 0.7057 0.7058 0.7059 
F statistic 50569.65*** 50643.49*** 50699.30*** 50705.69*** 50739.70*** 
Relative F statistic  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
  22.48*** 17.15*** 2.58 5.71*** ***p<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.10.  Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. 
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Table 5. TFP and buyer-supplier R&D spillovers:  
buyers and suppliers as shareholders vs. affiliated buyers and suppliers 
τ (distance parameter)  
all firms - no supplier/customer relation -0.014 
 [0.00636]** 
all suppliers and customers 0.000 
 [0.00095] 
δ (spillover ‘markup’)  
suppliers - no capital ties 3.639 
 [0.00066]*** 
customers - no capital ties 2.401 
 [0.00064]*** 
suppliers or customers - shareholders 24.549 
 [0.00005]*** 
suppliers or customers - affiliated 12.200 
 [0.00001]*** 
Parent R&D stock 0.021 
 [0.00231]*** 
R&D spillover stock 0.013 
 [0.00229]*** 
Other parameters:  
Parent R&D stock > 0 (dummy) -0.006 
 [0.00818] 
Number of other plants  -0.012 
 [0.00477]** 
Multi-products (4digit) plant (dummy) -0.021 
 [0.00357]*** 
Number of plant employees -0.004 
 [0.00488] 
Entry plant (dummy) 0.050 
 [0.02535]** 
Plant age 0.171 
 [0.03891]*** 
Plant age squared -0.032 
 [0.00801]*** 
Firm age -0.168 
 [0.04368]*** 
Firm age squared 0.032 
 [0.00905]*** 
Closing plant (dummy) -0.028 
 [0.00871]*** 
Constant -0.070 
 [0.06365] 
Industry dummies (JIP industry level) Yes 
# observations 21206 
R-squared 0.7059 
F statistic 50727.48*** 
***p<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.10.  Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. 
 
 
24 
 
 
Table 6. Reverse causality: do high productivity firms self select R&D intensive buyers and suppliers? 
 
Independent variables ln (supplier R&D) I(supplier R&D > 0) ln (customer R&D) I(customer R&D > 0)
ln (plant TFP) -0,1516 -0,0258 -0,3020 -0,0618
[0.00521]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0120]*** [0.0025]***
Plant industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partners' industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0,103 0,097 0,221 0,184
N 552.593 552.593 323.828 323.828
***p<0.01. Standard errors are in brackets.
Dependent variables
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Figure 1. Buyer/supplier relationships and distance between plants (cumulative percentage of total 
number of plants) 
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Figure 2. Decay in R&D spillovers (vertical axis) as a function of geographic distance (horizontal axis) 
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